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Overview This paper proposes to compute the meanings associated to sentences
with generic NPs corresponding to the most of generalized quantifier. We call these
generics specimens and they resemble stereotypes or prototypes in lexical semantics.
The meanings are viewed as logical formulae that can be thereafter interpreted in your
favorite models.
We rather depart from the dominant Fregean single untyped universe and go for
type theory with hints from Hilbert ε calculus [8, 3] and from medieval philosophy see
e.g. [6]. Our type theoretic analysis bears some resemblance with on going work in
lexical semantics. [2, 4]
Our model also applies to classical examples involving a class (or a generic ele-
ment of this class) which is provided by the context. An outcome of this study is that,
in the minimalism-contextualism debate, see e.g. [5], if one adopts a type theoreti-
cal view, terms encode the purely semantic meaning component while their typing is
pragmatically determined.
Terms for universal and specimen generics Here are two examples from the web.
The first one involves a universal generic element and the second one a specimen:
(1) The AKC notes that any dog may bite [...]
(2) The Brits love France.
As Hilbert calculus shows, quantifiers, classes and generic elements are closely
related. He introduced τx. A, an element such that ∀x. A(x) is equivalent to A(τx. A(x)):
A holds for every object if and only if it holds for this element τx. A(x), i.e. it is
the universal generic associated with A. 1 This view is rather confidential. Some
exceptions are the work on definite NPs with ι choice function (in particular by von
Heusinger see e.g. [9]) and [1] on generalized quantifiers.
Here we suggest to associate to any property A its specimen written ∡x. A. In-
tuitively, it enjoys all the properties that are true of most of A. Although this paper
remains on the “syntactic side of semantics”, inhabited with logical formulae, let us
give a few hints on how to interpret specimens and their possible reference in models.
1There is the dual existential generic εx.A which satisfies A(εx.A(x))≡ A(τx.¬A(x))).
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Properties of ∡x. A are the ones that are true of most of the A 2 there can be no
contradiction, since when P holds of the specimen,¬P does not. – in Hilbertian terms it
is more like a τ than like an ε . For scalar values we prefer to have relations rather than
functions: indeed the specimen has not, for instance, a single height but the relation
height(spec,x) is true whenever x is in some interval (think of baby height charts).
As far as proofs are concerned, we know some situations which enables to assert
that P holds of ∡x. A: when the universal quantifier holds, when all the most of prop-
erties are true of it,... But, as expected, we do not know any complete set of rules. We
also know it can be refuted when there are only a small minority of A enjoys P, or when
there is another property Q disjoint from P and true of ∡x. A.
The specimen can be foreseen in ancient and medieval logic: the predication on
object as member of some class, formal generic elements with a given ontological class,
essential and accidental properties ... In particular, predicates that apply to several
unrelated classes were distinguished from “homogenous” predicates that apply to (the
generic element of) a class, – as in Abu’l Barakat or Dun Scott. [6]
A flexible typed calculus with a specimen operator As in Montague semantics
we assume that a lexicon associates typed λ -terms with each word, and we start from
a syntactic analysis (saying what applies to what). The logical formula depicting the
meaning is obtained by applying lexical λ -terms one to another, according to the syn-
tax. In addition to this montagovian term depicting argumental structure each word is
also provided with a finite number of λ -terms which are optionally used to convert the
type when needed. For instance the lexicon provide for some human entries a term
which convert them into vehicles when needed, e.g if a VP like “is parked up for the
night” is applied to “Nic”.
Instead of simply typed λ -calculus we use second order λ -calculus, namely Girard
system F (1971), see e.g. [7]. Base types are constant types (the usual ones of TYn,
t, ei, lots of entity types), or variable types, α , β , ... When T1 and T2 are types, so is
T1→ T2 and when T is a type and α is a type variable, Πα. T is a type as well – α
usually appears in T but not necessarily.
As opposed to other type theories e.g. (I)TT, the system is conceptually and for-
mally extremely simple, quite powerful,... and paradox free.
2Observe that we do not fix a precise ratio much larger than a half. Indeed, it is a vague quantifier.
However most of as opposed to what is commonly said, is not a matter of cardinality but of measure: for
instance in maths books it is said that most of number are not primes meaning limn→+∞ pi(n)→ 0.
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Term building operations include the ones of simply typed λ -calculus:
vc Constants (resp. variables) of a given type T are terms: c : T (resp. x : T ).
eλ If u is a term of type T1→T2 and v is a term of type T1, then u(v) is a term of type
T2.
iλ If u is a term of type T2 and x a variable of type T1, then λ x. u is a term of type
T1→T2.
These usual operations are completed by quite similar operations handling quantifica-
tion over all types:
eΛ If u is a term of type Πα. U and T is a type, then u{T} is a (specialized) term of
type U [α := T ]
iΛ If u is a term of type T and if there is no occurrence of the type variable α in the
type of any free variable (u works uniformly for every type α), then Λα.u is a term of
type Πα. T (that’s the universal view of u).
Remember usual beta-reduction is (λ xT . u)tT  u[x := t] Here, beta-reduction for
types and Λ works just the same: (Λα. u){T} u[α := T ].
In F, instead of having a constant ∀α of type (α → t)→ t for every type α over
which we would like to quantify we shall have one constant ∀ of type Πα. (α→ t)→ t
that will be applied to T to obtain the quantifier over the type T :
∀{human}(λ xhuman.mortalhuman→t(x)
We introduce a constant ∡ of type Πα. α mapping each property to its specimen.
When applied to a type T , this constant ∡ yields the element ∡{T} of type T which
is assumed to be the specimen of T (∡{T} is the F term for ∡x.T when types and
properties are identified): it is to be interpreted consequently when interpreting the
resulting formula. We could also use the type raised version, mapping each property A
to the average element of type A as some did for the choice function.
Computing the readings: semantic terms and contextual typing It is easily seen
that our model will provide the right formula for the example (2):
love(∡{brits},France)
It resembles the ι choice function, apart that it selects an element about which we
can assert properties but which does not exists stricto sensu, as medieval universals,
Hilbert’s τx. A, etc.
We actually started our reflexion on such generics from classical examples in the
minimalism-contextualism debate. Such statements can be both true and false depend-
ing on the class in which the object is considered, which is provided by the context.
(3) Carlotta is tall.
If Carlotta is a two year old girl it can be both true (”My daughter is tall and thin
for a 2 year old.”) and false (”My two-year-old can’t get his own cup [...] because he
can’t reach, [...]”) depending on her class – her type in our type theoretic framework.
We noticed that the specimen notion together with the flexibility of F typing suc-
ceed to capture this phenomenon. Many of optional λ -terms encode the ontological
relations and in the case of a two-year old girl like Carlotta, she can be viewed as a
child, and also as a female human being, as a human being etc.
Here are the constants and the useful lexicon entries:
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height : Πα. (α→float→ t)
<: float→float→ t
Carlotta Carlotta : 2yoGirl (constant)
h : 2yoGirl→human (optional λ -term)
tall Λα.λ xα∀{float}λ hfloats ∀{float}λ hfloat
height{α}(∡{α},hs)∧height{α}(x,h)⇒ hs < h
type of tall: Πα.α→ t
The constant height is a relation between members of a type and numbers (float)
which are compared with <. The entry for tall applies to any type T (second order is
quite important here as well) and to a term u of type T . It says that the object u is taller
than any possible height of the specimen of this class T .
If we do not use any optional λ -term, we apply tall to the type 2yoGirl, and to the
constant Carlotta2yoGirl we get the reading where Carlotta is taller than the maximal
height of the 2yoGirl specimen (think again of baby height charts). This is likely to be
interpreted as true.
But if we apply tall to the human type, we cannot apply the result to the constant
Carlotta2yoGirl. But we can apply the h : 2yoGirl→ human (optional λ -term) to the
constant Carlotta2yoGirl and proceed: using the type human since h(Carlotta) is of
type human. We thus obtain the formula meaning that Carlotta is tall as a human
being, which is unlikely to be interpreted as true.
The semantic machinery produces every possible reading and the context intervenes
as a preference for some optional transformation(s). It should be discussed whether
there is one or several natural types for an object. Our model can handle any solution:
a single natural type, several privileged types,... — quite often, such ontological or
metaphysical questions spontaneously pop up when dealing with the organization of
the concepts in the lexicon.
Conclusion We applied the F typed λ -calculus to derive semantic readings in the
presence of “most of” generics, that we call specimens. Our treatment also helps to
determine the border between semantics and pragmatics: the term calculus models the
semantics, while the typing flexibility of F represents the possible context adaptation.
Thanks This work owes a lot to Sarah-Jane Conrad (meaning.ch , Sprachphiloso-
phie, Universita¨t Bern). Indeed, her talk and our discussions initiated in Cerisy on the
debate between contextualism and semantic minimalism, lead us to a new connection
between logical semantics and type theory, here applied to generic elements.
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